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Restructuring the Electric Utility
Industry and Its Effect on the
Environment
WILuIAM G. ROSENBERG*
Today, I am going to talk to you about what I perceive to
be the largest challenge to date to the successful implementa-
tion of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA).- That
legislation was the environmental priority of the Bush Ad-
ministration and passed the House by a 401 to 21 vote,2 and
the Senate by a 89 to 11 vote.3 The goals of the CAAA were to
solve the international Acid Rain problem and to reduce na-
tional ambient air pollution levels by fifty billion pounds. The
CAAA have been difficult and costly to implement for some
industries and states - but the nation is seeing results.
The Title IV Acid Rain program,4 the first ever truly
market-based clean air program, has successfully reduced
S02 nationwide faster than scheduled and at 10% of the pro-
jected cost. The Acid Rain program will generate even more
reductions in the next phase of implementation, beginning in
2000. The reformulated gasoline program has benefited the
nation with 15% emission reductions. Cars keep getting
* Founder and President of E3 Ventures Inc., a strategic consulting busi-
ness specializing in developing market-based programs to improve environmen-
tal protection. Appointed by President Bush in 1988, Rosenberg was the
Environmental Protection Agency's Assistant Administrator for Air and Radia-
tion from 1989 to 1992. At the EPA, he introduced and successfully imple-
mented the landmark Clean Air Act Amendments and its market-based and
consensus oriented initiatives. He received both his M.B.A. and J.D. from Co-
lumbia University and his BA_ from Syracuse University.
1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA), Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2399 (1990).
2. See CONGRESSIONAL INDEX (CCH), 101st Cong., H.R. 37,135 (1989-
1990).
3. See CONGRESSIONAL INDEX (CCH), 101st Cong., S. 23,035 (1989-1990).
4. Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1990).
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cleaner; and due to requirements in the CAAA, new cars emit
50% less VOC and NOx pollutants than 1990 models.
In summary, the CAAA were adopted only after exten-
sive debates and contradicting political wills, but ultimately
with near unanimous support - Congress and the Bush Ad-
ministration made the commitment to clean up America's air
and improve our nation's health. However, these gains, and
future improvements in air quality, are threatened by the un-
intended, but very real consequences of unfolding federal and
state efforts to restructure the electric utility industry with-
out appropriate accompanying environmental protection
provisions.
Let me lay the groundwork of the energy policy before we
begin to discuss environmental policy. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) is the federal agency respon-
sible for regulating wholesale electricity transactions. In an
effort to deregulate the last remaining regulated industry in
America and to introduce more market incentives, FERC ini-
tiated, through Order 888,5 a framework to allow utilities to
compete with one another and to have the opportunity to pro-
vide power to areas and customers that were previously re-
stricted to the regulated, local utility.
The electric utility industry is the nation's largest indus-
try, as well as the single largest source of air pollution emis-
sions. The annual revenue of the electric industry
nationwide is approximately $180 billion. To put that in con-
text, gasoline refiners revenues are approximately $100 bil-
lion in annual revenue; and, the automobile industry sales
are $160 billion annually. The electric industry is a major
industry with huge revenues and tremendous local and na-
tional political clout - not to mention its daily contact with
every citizen of this country. It is that amount of money and
power that makes its behaviors and business decisions so
very important in this country.
5. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discrimi-
natory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (1996) (to be




What I learned at the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is that, notwithstanding all the details of science, im-
plementation problems, VOC vs. NOx, etc., the principle fo-
cus to reduce air pollution is to make cars, gasoline, and
power plants cleaner and more efficient. Consequently, any
major political or economic decisions relating to these indus-
tries are going to have significant impacts on the environ-
ment - impacts that policy-makers should watch very closely.
Automobiles and gasoline were thoroughly addressed in
the CAAA and are consequently cleaner. The power industry
was also addressed - but in a more limited way. The pollution
predictions and consequent regulations were based on behav-
iors resulting from a regulated market. Unfortunately, the
power generation and distribution changes that will occur
from FERC's deregulation efforts in the energy sector were
never anticipated or predicted during the clean air debate.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct)6 paved the way for
FERC's deregulation effort, but did not specifically address
the resulting environmental impacts on air pollution. It is
those potential impacts that policy-makers are struggling to
address.
Presently, in a regulated power environment, there are a
small number of regional markets around the country where
utilities are organized into "power pools" to serve their re-
spective customers. The Midwest utilities serve, essentially,
only the Midwest region. The New Jersey, Delaware, Penn-
sylvania and Maryland utilities serve their local areas.
There is a "New England" power pool and a "Florida" power
pool, as well as one in the Middle Atlantic states, and others.
For the most part, the power that is needed in any particular
area is generated and distributed by utilities or independent
power producers located in the same area.
I represent the largest utility in the Northeast, Public
Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) in New Jersey.
PSE&G produces most of its power through a combination of
nuclear, gas, oil and coal facilities. PSE&G does not pres-
ently compete with other power producers to sell retail elec-
6. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
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tricity in its service area. The New Jersey Board of Public
Utilities, a state utility regulatory board, plays the tradi-
tional utility economic regulatory role and ensures PSE&G
and other New Jersey utilities charge "reasonable and pru-
dent" prices in exchange for monopoly status.
Restructuring of the electricity industry will eliminate
these separate regional market areas by opening up access to
customers for other marketers and, in essence, move toward
the creation of a competitive national marketplace. It may be
economically attractive to make these utilities compete with
one another, but it introduces a host of issues and conse-
quences that this country has not previously faced. When
there is growth in any region of the country (i.e., south, west,
or coastal areas), rather than focusing on meeting the power
needs for that growth with local generation, customers will
have the ability to buy power from any utility or power mar-
keter, regardless of where they are physically located. Cus-
tomers can contract directly for power transmission across
electric lines which will, of course, favor increased production
from the least expensive generators. Unfortunately, the least
expensive sources are also likely to be the most polluting
sources.
In the recently deregulated telecommunications indus-
try, customers can choose MCI, AT&T, Sprint or other long
distance companies and look for the least expensive service.
The same competitive system is now being considered for the
utility industry and, in the same vein of "saving money," cus-
tomers will look for the cheapest rates.
With one big marketplace, the most compelling issue ini-
tially is: where will the cheapest power be generated? The
problem for the environment presents itself when one real-
izes that kilowatt hour prices do not reflect the full societal
expense for utilizing that energy. The kilowatt price captures
the cost of generation, transmission, and distribution. But,
what about the cost to clean up the pollution that comes from
producing the electricity. Who pays for that? And when do
they pay?
We know that coal burning produces high levels of NOx,




more expensive nuclear and natural gas generation. We
know what these pollutant do to trees, crops, equipment, and
human lungs. We know through the CAAA how much it costs
and how difficult it is to clean up ambient air pollution in the
largest population areas. The resulting policy issue that
must be addressed today is: electric industry restructuring
will predictably respond to free market pressures and favor
the least-cost power - but, is it the responsibility of the gov-
ernment to ensure that the initial kilowatt price captures the
predictable environmental consequences of power produc-
tion? And, if the initial kilowatt price for the producer is not
structured in a way to include the price of environmental
clean up, how does the country appropriately strengthen the
CAAA and force recoupment of these costs on the customers
that suffer from the pollution, but who had nothing to do with
its creation? It is the classic policy question around the ap-
propriate role of government to protect national interests in
the framework of free market economic systems.
Now, let me address the environmental impact. As
demonstrated in the following statistical charts,7 the lowest-
cost producers of power, by far, are the older, Midwest power
plants that have the fewest environmental controls. These
plants, which are also incidentally upwind of the Northeast
and Midwest population centers of the eastern half of the
United States, with no further governmental intervention,
will benefit from the greatest consumer demand and will sig-
nificantly increase production in turn increasing emissions.
If a purely free market selling price is the only issue, rather
than utilizing clean burning nuclear or gas power or building
a new clean generator, customers across the country will
favor the cheapest power (typically a coal-based generator)
instead of local production - even if the local producer offers
cleaner energy. The amount of cheap power production in the
Midwest will increase, the amount of pollution generated up-
wind of Midwest and Northeast population centers will in-
crease, and the need for controls to clean up the additional
7. On ifie with speaker.
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pollution in the Northeast will exceed the predictions and
controls planned for in the CAAA.
Under the current regulated system, prior to electricity
restructuring, to meet demand growth, a utility has a choice
to build either a clean-burning, new natural gas generator at
3 to 4 cents per kilowatt hour, or new coal generator at 5 or 7
cents per kilowatt hour. When a region needs more power,
the state utility commission must approve plans by the local
utility company to build, or purchase power, from either a
new natural gas facility, a coal facility that meets the emis-
sion requirements of the CAAA, or to increase demand-side
energy conservation investments. Under a deregulated
structure, this utility or its customers directly, will be able to
provide the additional power by purchasing excess power
from any other part of the country. Current rates for various
fuel sources are: old coal (1 to 3 cents/kWh), natural gas (3-4
cents/kWh), new coal (5-7 cents/kWh), and nuclear (8 cents/
kWh).
Where cost of generation is the primary factor,s the mar-
ket choice is obvious. The vast majority of consumers will go
for the lowest-cost option. The cost of increasing production
from existing facilities, which do not require significant new
capital costs and, for the most part, can use existing trans-
mission lines, is approximately 50% lower than the next low-
est alternative cost. Therefore, the important question to ask
is: what is the capacity to increase production from existing
power plants and will there be a flood of this cheap, dirty coal
power that will displace demand for more expensive new nat-
ural gas or modern coal plants?
What makes this a particularly interesting issue is that
this is not a theoretical political question. It is happening in
real time. Electricity restructuring is providing choices that
affect rates, the economy, and the environment. There are
many avenues to restructuring and the final route selected
today by consumers, policy-makers, and elected officials will
shape how the future market will function and how public
health will be affected.




The politics of this issue are very relevant. The EPAct of
1992 gave FERC the authority to approve open transmission
access on a "case by case" basis. FERC proposed Order 888 in
an effort to devise a broad, uniform policy to open access. In
the original rule as proposed by FERC, there was no Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) analyzing the potential clean
air implications. PSE&G and other Northeast utilities joined
forces with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
the Mid-Atlantic Energy Project (MAEP), and other environ-
mental organizations as well as all of the Northeast Gover-
nors to appeal to the White House and Council on
Environmental Quality to insist on an EIS.
The EIS ultimately concluded that there would be an in-
crease in emissions resulting from the increased plant capac-
ity utilization. However, the EIS also determined that it was
the EPA's job to address clean up rather than FERC's, the
agency crafting and implementing restructuring. It cannot
be overlooked that the decision to defer FERC responsibility
and the early inclusion of environmental mitigation language
was made in a political year when there were important elec-
toral votes in the Midwest coal-burning states of Ohio, West
Virginia, Indiana, and Illinois.
During FERC Order 888 policy development, FERC ac-
knowledged that there is capacity to increase utilization of
old coal plants from the current 62% to an 82% utilization
without having to invest major capital for plant improve-
ment. That is a one-third increase in the amount of energy
generated from these high-polluting power plants, located
downwind of Northeast and Midwest population centers.
Therefore, under Order 888, as it is currently written using
FERC's own projections, a deregulated electricity market will
demand 311 billion more kilowatt hours from old coal plants
rather than new natural gas plants.
Environmentally speaking, that amount of increased coal
production will generate 572,000 tons of additional NOx east
of the Mississippi. In the context of the CAAA, that amount
of NOx is equivalent to all the Phase One NOx reductions
under the Title IV Acid Rain program; it is equivalent to
doubling all the utility generation in Ohio and West Virginia
1996]
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in the year 2000; and it is equivalent to all the NOx emitted
from every power plant from Washington D.C. to Maine. A
one-third increase in production from existing coal generators
will create a major air pollution problem.
The Northeast is already spending billions of dollars to
comply with the CAAA, such as requiring inspection and
maintenance (I&M) for vehicles, cleaner cars, and reformu-
lated gasoline. If done properly, the I&M program is
designed to reduce NOx emissions in the Northeast by
162,000 tons. It is costly, inconvenient, and highly unpopu-
lar, yet full compliance and implementation would only offset
one-third of the estimated emissions that will result from in-
creasing the Midwest coal plant capacity from 62% to 82%.
There are also other examples that put this into context: the
reformulated gasoline program was designed in the CAAA to
reduce NOx emissions in the Northeast by 30,000 tons. If
10% of all cars sold in the Northeast during the next ten
years were electric cars, only 10,000 tons of NOx reductions
would result. Three hundred eleven billion kilowatt hours of
coal would replace natural gas generation that would utilize
2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. It is a gigantic number
and it is ridiculous to assume that the environment will not
be adversely affected by fuel shifting from clean natural gas
to dirty coal plants, unless preventative controls are placed
on the plants prior to restructuring.
As a policy-maker responsible for implementing the 1990
CAAA, I can tell you that it is a tough job to impose signifi-
cant pollution controls. Yet, I have difficulty understanding
why the Administration would not do everything in their
power to prevent pollution before it is created, instead of con-
tributing to another massive pollution build-up that will have
to be fixed, at a higher eventual cost to industry and consum-
ers, sometime in the future.
In closing, I might point out that not all lawmakers are
closing their eyes to this problem: every Northeast state Gov-
ernor, whether Republican, Democrat, or Independent -
from Governors Ridge (R-Pa.), Whitman (R-N.J.), Pataki (R-
N.Y.), and Weld (R-Mass.) to Dean (D-Vt.) and King (I-Me.)
- has sent letters to the Administration in support of open
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access for economic competition among utilities, provided
that as a part of such an effort, provisions for mitigation of
the regional adverse environmental consequences are in-
cluded. They know that "what goes up, must come down,"
and significant NOx pollution emitted from high stacks in the
Midwest - just like SO2 from the same sources - will even-
tually come down as ozone and particulates in the Northeast.
Cleaning up the pollution in the Northeast will require
tighter local emission standards for gasoline, cars, printing
presses, pharmaceutical plants, and dry cleaners, as well as
regionwide reductions from power plants contributing to
transboundary pollution. When you look at the aggregate of
these costs, and the impact on consumers, it is far more ex-
pensive to pay for more local Northeast controls than it is to
reduce pollution at its source in the Ohio Valley. Transported
pollution from utility restructuring is not only a bad idea
from a public health point of view, but it also imposes a stiff
economic burden on the downwind states, which will surely
offset many of the economic gains that FERC promises with
deregulation.
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